Abstract
Introduction
In recent years, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have attracted increasing attentions due to their self-organizing nature and ease of deployment. A MANET comprises a group of mobile nodes, which can communicate with other nodes located within the transmission range directly, or employ a multi-hop communication to reach non-neighboring nodes. Some works [1, 2] integrate MANETs with the Internet to extend the network coverage and enhance the flexibility of network. The so called hybrid MANET employs gateway nodes as bridge to translate the protocols between two heterogeneous networks.
The wireless and mobility nature make MANETs face more security risks than traditional wire networks [3, 4] . Thus, effective security mechanism is one crucial prerequisite for secure network communication. Lots of researches have been down to secure wireless networks, like the detection of attacks [5] [6] [7] , various kinds of cryptographic algorithms [8] [9] [10] and security strategies with certificate management [11] [12] [13] [14] . Among them, certificate management is a widely adopted mechanism which helps validate the trustworthiness of mobile nodes. Before joining a MANET, every Zhiping Jia is thr Corresponding Author.
cluster head.
In the voting-based mechanism, the certificate revocation is the result of the vote of all neighboring nodes. In [21] , a suspicious node is recognized as a malicious node only if there are at least m out of N mobile nodes cast accusations independently against it. This scheme achieves a higher accuracy of certificate revocation, however, requires a long time to revoke a certificate. Besides, the selection for the value of m is another challenge.
To improve the efficiency of certificate revocation, some schemes [15, 17] assign each node a value as accusation weight. The accusation weight, which indicates the trustworthiness of the node, is calculated according to the past behaviors, like the number of accusations made against other nodes and that accuse it from others. The node with higher accusation weight plays a more important role in the certificate revocation process. When the weighted sum of accusations against a suspicious node exceeds a predefined threshold, the certificate of the accused node is revoked. The voting-based mechanism enhances the accuracy of certificate revocation, owing to the participation of all nodes. However, the participation of all nodes increases the communication overhead, due to that more voting messages are exchanged between mobile nodes. 
Assumptions of the Scheme
In this section, we first introduce the model of the proposed revocation scheme for hybrid mobile ad hoc networks. We assume that there are several MANETs in the network, and mobile nodes can roam freely from a MANET to another one. Each MANET connects with the Internet through a gateway node, which works as a bridge between two heterogeneous networks. We assume that all gateway nodes are well protected and can be trusted. They are also equipped with more resource for calculation and data storage than ordinary mobile nodes. A trusted third party, certificate authority, is deployed in the network to manager all nodes' certificates, including certificate distribution and certificate revocation. Since only the issue of certificate revocation is discussed, the scheme assumes that every mobile node has already got a certificate when joining a MANET. To address the certificate revocation scheme, we assume that all nodes work in promiscuous mode. Thus, mobile nodes are able to detect malicious activities of their one-hop neighboring nodes by using various detection systems. However, the issue on attack detection mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. We assume that all malicious activities can be detected. The architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 . Once a node detects malicious activities of its one-hop neighboring node, it sends an accusation packet to the gateway node. Each node is allowed to accuse a given node only once. The gateway node is in charge of the execution of certificate revocation algorithm, including updating the variables of each mobile node, calculating the accusation weight, storing accusation packets and determining whether a node should be revoked or not. The accusation weight of a node is calculated according to its past activities, such as accusing other nodes or being accused by other nodes. Higher accusation weight means the node is more trusted as a legitimate node. Once the weight of the accuser is larger than that of the accused node, the certificate of the accused node is revoked. With this 'acceleration strategy', the proposed certificate revocation scheme can remove a misbehavior node more quickly than traditional threshold-based voting method. Besides, the malicious node can launch false accusation attacks against a legitimate node with a predefined attack probability. As a result, the certificate of a legitimate node may be wrongly revoked. To cope with wrong certificate revocation problem, mobile node is allowed to send vindication packets to the corresponding gateway node whenever it thinks the certificate of its one-hop neighboring node is wrongly revoked. The gateway node is in charge of the final decision.
Details of the Scheme
In this section, the details of the proposed certificate revocation scheme are given.
Data Collection
Mobile nodes accuse other nodes by sending accusation packets. The accusation packets are finally forwarded to the corresponding gateway node and stored in the accusation list for a period of time after they are processed. These accusations are used to calculate the accusation weight of nodes and estimate the legality of a suspicious node.
The proposed scheme needs to keep track of the following variables, the values of which are used to compute accusation weight:
The variable represents the total number of accusations made against node i. Both the accuser and the accused node should have valid certificates. When a gateway node receives a valid accusation packet, it updates this variable, and then stores the packet in its accusation list table. The initial value is set to zero. i a : It records the total number of accusations made by node i. The accuser is not allowed to accuse a same node twice. When the accusation made by node i is received by the gateway node, this variable will be updates. However, if the certificate of the accused node is finally revoked, the accusations made against it are not counted. The initial value is set to zero. 
Certificate Revocation Procedure
Each node is monitored by its one-hop neighbors, and malicious activities can be detected. The revocation procedure is started when attack activities of a node are detected. Every legitimate one-hop neighboring node checks whether the malicious node is listed in local CRL or not. If the certificate of malicious node has been revoked, nothing needs to be down. Otherwise, each neighboring node makes an Accusation Packet (AP) and sends it to the corresponding gateway node. Upon receiving the AP, the gateway node checks the status of accuser's certificate. If the certificate is valid, the AP will be stored in the accusation list, and the variables of both the accuser and the accused node are updated. If the weight of the accuser is larger than that of the accused node, the accused node will be recognized as a malicious node and added to the CRL of the gateway node. After that, the gateway node notifies CA to revoke the certificate of the accused node and meanwhile informs mobile nodes by broadcasting this revocation information to the MANET.
Take Figure 2 as an example. Malicious node M launches attacks towards some nodes and, its malicious activities are detected by one-hop neighboring nodes N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5. The scheme revokes M's certificate according to the following procedure:
Step 1. Each of neighboring nodes (N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5) detects malicious activities of node M and casts an accusation packet against node M. The accusation packets are forwarded to gateway G.
Step 2. All accusations are cached in the waiting list of gateway G. They are processed one by one according to their arriving time.
Step 3. If the waiting list is empty, go to Step 6. Otherwise, Gateway G processes the earliest arrived accusation, supposing made by node x. Gateway G updates x a and m A , stores the accusation in the accusation list, and calculates the accusation weight of node x and M. If x w is larger than m w , go to Step 4, otherwise, repeat Step 3.
Step 4. Gateway G clears all accusations in the waiting list; adds node M to the CRL; notifies the CA and broadcasts the revocation information to the MANET; updates i a (minus one) for all nodes successfully accused M.
Step 5. Upon receiving the revocation information, mobile nodes update their local CRL.
Step 6. Finish the procedure. 
Dealing with Wrong Revocation
False accusations made by malicious nodes against legitimate nodes influence the reliability of the scheme. In this subsection, we detail the methods to degrade the influence of false accusations. As described in Section 4.1, once a false accusation is accepted by the gateway node, the weight of the accused legitimate node will be reduced. This degrades the ability of the legitimate node to revoke the certificate of malicious node, and increases the risk for legitimate node to be wrongly revoked.
If a node is wrongly revoked, its one-hop neighboring nodes and the gateway node will cooperate to recover its certificate. As discussed in the above subsection, when a node is determined as a malicious node according to the accusation messages, gateway node will broadcast the decision to the MANET to inform all mobile nodes. Each node updates its local CRL to record the new certificate revocation information. However, if a node is falsely accused and wrongly revoked, all of its legitimate one-hop neighboring nodes can aware that the revocation decision is incorrect, for they have not detected any malicious activities since being its neighbors. Consequently, neighboring nodes try to correct the mistake by sending Vindication Packets (VPs) to the corresponding gateway node. When the gateway node receives VPs, recovery mechanism is started to re-estimate the validity of the node under dispute. If the number of VPs exceeds a predefined threshold K, the under dispute node is recognized as a legitimate node and recovered certificate.
For example, in Figure 3 , node N0 is a legitimate node and is wrongly revoked due to the accusations made by malicious nodes M1 and M2. We suppose that the accusation made by M1 directly result in the wrong certificate revocation of N0. Nodes N1, N2, N3, M1 and M2 are one-hop neighbors of node N0. Certificate recovery procedure is described as bellowing:
Step 1. The certificate of node N0 is revoked. All mobile nodes are informed this certificate revocation.
Step 2. Legitimate nodes N1, N2, N3 detect that N0 was wrongly revoked. Thus, each of them sends a vindication packet to gateway G independently.
Step 3. Gateway G receives these vindication packets and counts the number of them. If the number is larger than the predefined threshold K, the certificate of N0 is recovered. Meanwhile, Gateway G updates the value of variables:
, notifies CA and all mobile nodes the new decision. Otherwise, the status of N0 is set to 0.
Even if the recovery operation is not successful, the node N0 is still removed from the CRL and the status of which is set as under-dispute. This status deprives the right to accuse other nodes, however, still allows the node to take part in the communications. In the future, if the node under-dispute is accused again, its certificate will be revoked directly. Besides, there are also other chances for an under-dispute node to be recovered. For example, if the node, which accusation directly results in the wrong certificate revocation, is affirmed as a malicious node, the under-dispute node will be revived.
Node Migration
In the proposed architecture, each gateway node is in charge of communication security for mobile nodes in a MANET. Thus, a gateway node only traces the activities of mobile nodes of its MANET. However, mobile nodes can roam freely from a MANET to another one. When a mobile node moves to another MANET, the corresponding gateway node should first verify the validity of certificate by querying the CA. The query result is broadcasted to the whole MANET. If the certificate of the new joining node is not listed in the certificate revocation list, the gateway node should further get its history activity information by communicating with the previous gateway node. This helps to track the overall activities of a node before evaluating its validity. Thus, this tracking mechanism is valuable for the reliability of certificate revocation scheme in the case of node migration.
Discussion
In order to reduce revocation time, our certificate revocation scheme do not adopt 'voting period' used in previous works [15] . In other words, whenever the accusation weight of the accuser is larger than that of the accused node, the certificate of the accused node is revoked immediately, not at the end of the voting period. When the legitimate nodes take the majority of the network, intuitively, this mechanism can work effectively. However, it is possible for a legitimate node to be wrongly revoked, even if there are only very few malicious nodes in the network. For example, supposing that only two malicious nodes M1, M2 exist in the network and both of them are the neighboring nodes of a legitimate node N. If M1, M2 both falsely accuse node N at the beginning, the accusation weight of M1 or M2 may larger than that of N, and this leads to the certificate revocation of N.
Therefore, the wrong revocation recovery mechanism is particularly important to ensure the accuracy of revocation scheme. The selection of threshold K is critical for the vindication of wrongly revoked nodes. Liu etc. [20] have proved by both the mathematical analysis and simulations that the optimal threshold K is equal to M/2, where M is the number of one-hop neighbors. The optimal threshold increases the accuracy of determining whether an accused node is a malicious node or a legitimate node, however, still cannot achieve one hundred percent accuracy. Because it is possible that more than half neighboring nodes of a given node are malicious nodes.
Table 1．Simulation Parameters

Parameter Value
Simulation area 1000m×1000m
Transmission range 250m
Simulation time 600s
Mobility model Random way point (RWP)
Pause time 10s
Gateway coordinate (0, 500)
Maximum speed 10m/s
False accusation probability(p) 0.2 or 0.5
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present and discuss the simulation results conducted in the network simulator, NS-2.33, which is extended with the Global Connectivity support [22] . We first run simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed certificate revocation scheme, in particular, to affirm the effectiveness of the wrong revocation recovery mechanism. To verify that our proposed scheme achieves a performance trade-off between voting-based mechanism and non-voting-based mechanism, we design extensive simulations to compare the efficiency and reliability of different certificate revocation schemes.
Simulation Setup
In the simulation, mobile nodes, which construct a mobile ad hoc network, are placed randomly in a square flat space area (1000m × 1000m). A gateway node is placed in the center of any edge of the square to provide Internet services. Each mobile node has the fixed transmission range as 250 meters, moves following the random way-point mobility pattern [23] , and communicates with other mobile nodes by running ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [24] as the routing protocol. The maximum velocity and the pause time are set to 10 m/s and 10 seconds, respectively. Among the mobile nodes, some are randomly designated as malicious nodes, which may launch false accusation attacks towards neighboring nodes with a predefined attack probability p (p is set to 0.2 or 0.5). A node may falsely accuse more than one neighboring node; however, it is only allowed to accuse a given node once. In order to increase the accuracy of the results, every simulation scenario runs 50 times with a simulation time of 600 seconds, and the average simulation results are calculated as the final data. The important simulation parameters are listed in Table 1 .
Effectiveness of the Proposed Scheme
In this subsection, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed lightweight certificate revocation scheme in terms of revocation accuracy, and in particular, we examine the effectiveness of the wrong revocation recovery mechanism. To achieve this, the whole certificate revocation scheme described in this paper is named as 'Our scheme', and the scheme without the wrong revocation recovery mechanism is named as 'Our scheme 1'. From 100 mobile nodes deployed in MANET, some are selected as malicious nodes. The number of malicious nodes is varied from 5 to 50 with an increment of 5 and the attack probability is set to 0.2 (or 0.5) for different simulation scenarios.
The accuracy of certificate revocation is defined as: Figure 4 demonstrates the revocation accuracy of the two compared schemes. In the 'Our scheme 1', it works only with a certificate revocation strategy that if the accusation weight of the accuser is larger than that of the accused node, the certificate of the accused node is revoked. From the Figure 4 we can observe that this strategy can detect more than 97% of the malicious nodes when p is set to 0.2. Even though the attack probability is high to 0.5, this strategy still detects more than 95% of the malicious nodes. However, this strategy also can wrongly recognized legitimate nodes as malicious nodes and revoke their certificates. Consequently, the wrong revocation recovery mechanism is obviously important in the improvement of the accuracy of certificate revocation. Table 2 shows the number of nodes which have been wrongly revoked and finally recovered by wrong revocation recovery mechanism. This model works well in recognizing and recovering the falsely revoked nodes and results in clear improvement of the accuracy of certificate revocation as shown in Figure 4 . We can notify that 'Our scheme' which equips with wrong revocation recovery mechanism achieves an obvious higher accuracy than 'Our scheme 1'. Consequently, we can conclude that the proposed lightweight certificate revocation scheme can effectively revoke the certificates of malicious nodes, especially with the help of the wrong revocation recovery mechanism. 
Figure 4．Revocation Accuracy
Comparing the Performance of Certificate Revocation Scheme
To verify that the proposed scheme inherits the merits of the voting-based scheme and the non-voting-based scheme, the proposed scheme is compared with a voting-based scheme ( RT is set to N/3) [15] and a non-voting-based scheme [20] in terms of revocation accuracy, revocation time and the number of accusations needed to revoke a certificate. The changes of the three metrics are examined in terms of different values of number of malicious nodes and node density. In the first test scenario, we deploy 100 mobile nodes in the network, in which the number of malicious nodes are varied from 10 to 50 with an increment of 10 for each simulation. In the other scenario, the number of malicious nodes is fixed to 35 and the density of mobile nodes (including the malicious nodes) is varied from 60 to 100 nodes/km2 with an increment of 10 for each simulation. In all simulations, the attack probability (p) is set to 0.5. Figure 5 andFigure 6 demonstrate the accuracy of certificate revocation impacted by the number of malicious nodes and the density of nodes, respectively. As expected from intuition, among the three schemes, the simulation results indicate that the voting-based scheme achieves a highest average accuracy when the number of malicious nodes is less than 30; the non-voting-based scheme works with a lowest average accuracy, and the accuracy of our proposed scheme is slightly lower than the voting-based scheme. In particular, as the number of malicious nodes is below N/3, the accuracy of voting-based scheme can reach 100 percent, however, when above the scheme's threshold (N/3), the accuracy drops dramatically. In contrast, our proposed scheme works smoothly with an accuracy of large than 98 percent, owing to the adoption of wrong revocation recovery mechanism. The increase of malicious nodes degrades the accuracy of certificate revocation because there are more malicious nodes take part in falsely accusing a legitimate node. On the other hand, higher node density improves the accuracy, as shown in Figure 6 . Figure 8 show us the average number of accusations required to revoke the certificate of a node. In this paper, other than the real accusation packets, the vindication packets are also deemed as accusation packet when calculating the average packet overhead for revocation schemes. As expected from intuition, the voting-based scheme needs obviously more accusations to revoke a certificate, because more nodes take part in the voting process. From the simulation results, we can observe that our scheme only need about 4 accusations to revoke the certificate of a node, which is slightly higher than that of the non-voting-based scheme (about 2 accusations). Among the 4 accusations needed in our proposed scheme, most of them are contributed by the real accusations. This can also explain the observation that the average accusations are not obviously influenced by the number of malicious nodes or the density of nodes. In contrast, in the non-voting-based scheme, one accusation is enough to revoke certificate, and the rest of the accusations are contributed by the vindication packets. Figure 9 and Figure 10 give another important metric for evaluating the performance of the revocation scheme -revocation time. Revocation time is defined as the time from a node first works maliciously until its certificate is revoked. We can observe that, the voting-based scheme consumes obviously longer revocation time than that of both our proposed scheme and the non-voting-based scheme, due to that the voting-based scheme always needs to wait for multiple votes to meet the conditions of certificate revocation. In contrast, the non-voting-based scheme requires only one single vote, and our proposed scheme needs small votes to make a decision. In addition, for this two schemes, the decrease of the node density or the increase of the number of malicious nodes results in the slightly increase of revocation time. Whatever conditions, the voting-based scheme has to take a long time to revoke the certificates of malicious node especially when the ratio of the malicious node increases. 
Figure 10．Impact of Node Density on Revocation Time
Consequently, we can summarize the simulation that, our proposed scheme can significantly reduce the revocation time and accusation overhead with a slight decrease of revocation accuracy, as compared with voting-based certificate revocation scheme. Particularly, our proposed scheme can also work effectively even if a larger number of malicious nodes exist in the network. Moreover, as compared with non-voting-based scheme, our scheme can achieve higher revocation accuracy with only a slight increase of revocation time and accusation overhead.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a lightweight certificate revocation scheme for hybrid mobile ad hoc networks. Our scheme is designed to retain the advantages of both voting-based and non-voting-based certificate revocation schemes. In order to ensure revocation accuracy, the scheme revoke the certificate of nodes based on weight-based multi-voting; meanwhile, to reduce the revocation time and overhead, the accused node is revoked immediately when its weight is less than the accuser. Thus, the accusations made by a few nodes can quickly revoke an accused node. Furthermore, to improve the accuracy, we have adopted a wrong revocation recovery mechanism to detect and recover the wrongly revoked nodes. In doing so, we have sufficient legitimate nodes to ensure the proposed scheme work effectively even in an environment with a high proportion of malicious nodes.
We have evaluated the performance of our scheme in a comparison way. The simulation results have demonstrated that our scheme achieves a performance trade-off: it obtains obvious higher revocation accuracy than non-voting-based scheme, and can revoke the certificate of a malicious node with notable shorter revocation time and fewer accusations compared with voting-based scheme.
